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1. INTRODUCTION 
Power systems have always needed flexibility to maintain their balance. With the rising amount of 
renewable, variable energy, this requirement becomes even more important [1]. One way of providing 
flexibility is through demand response of thermal loads. Smart Electric Thermal Storages (SETS) is a 
thermal storage which is charged with electricity and from the point of view of the power system it is 
similar to e.g. electric water heating or electric space heating with storage. SETS can only efficiently 
provide demand response (DR) if technical and non-technical barriers are removed [2]. Non-technical 
barriers can arise from power markets, tariff regulations, customer acceptance, supplier interest, and 
taxation. Although the contribution of small-scale DR is increasing, many such barriers still exist in EU 
countries. 
The importance of residential DR has been recognized in EU and specific provisions have been added in 
e.g. the Electricity Directive (2009/71/EC) and the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) [3]. 
However, in practise the participation of small DR resources is still in its infancy. The EC’s proposed 
revision of the Electricity Directive and Electricity Regulation, called the Clean energy for all Europeans 
package, could provide a major step towards including the full participation of DR. Similarly the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) has prepared network codes which all 
market operators, transmission system operators and balance service providers must implement.  
This report explores the barriers for the type of residential DR provided by SETS in European countries. 
The main focus is on regulatory barriers. We explore the main changes suggested by the new legislative 
proposals and network codes and suggest further recommendations. 
2. EUROPEAN MARKET REGULATION TRENDS  
2.1. Regulatory background 
The possibility of DR market participation is dependent on the overall market structure. The power 
markets integration process of the EU is dependent on mostly the driving force of the European 
Commission (EC). The main advantage of the EC over the individual member states is its approach to the 
process from a broader perspective and to be free from national interests [4]. EC has set up the Florence 
Electricity Regulatory Forum to discuss the creation of the internal electricity market. The Florence 
Forum decided in November 2008 to establish a Project Coordination Group of experts drawn from the 
European Commission, regulators, and relevant stakeholders, to develop an EU-wide Target Model and a 
roadmap for the integration of electricity markets. The target model included 
 A single European price coupled day-ahead market, 
 Implementation of continuous intra-day cross-border trading and 
 Pilot projects for the implementation of balancing markets. 
EU’s Third Legislative Package for the Internal Energy Market in 2009 was introduced to address further 
barriers to market liberalization. The package included provisions on market-based electricity pricing. 
Member States were required to implement smart metering where there is a positive cost benefit analysis. 
The third energy package also established and gave legal mandate to the organization of European 
transmission system operators ENTSO-E. 
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EU Parliament's resolution of 13 September 2016, “Towards a new energy market design”, addresses the 
issue. It notes that the task of integrating a growing share of renewables and prosumers into the electricity 
markets, but also of improving the mobilisation of demand response and storage, requires a combination 
of liquid short-term markets and long-term price signals. It calls for time-varying prices that reflect the 
scarcity or surplus of supply and provide incentives for storage and demand response  
The Energy Efficiency Directive of 2012 (EED) [3] has played an even more central role in driving 
demand flexibility [5]. In addition to including additional and clear provisions on smart metering and 
billing based on consumption information, the Directive includes a series of policy measures (Article 15) 
which require Member States to promote DR. The EED states that Member States shall remove those 
incentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that might hamper participation of DR, in balancing 
markets and ancillary services procurement. Furthermore, TSO’s and DSO’s should define technical 
modalities for participation in balancing, reserve and other system services markets on the basis of the 
technical requirements of these markets and the capabilities of DR, including the DR provided by 
aggregators. However, as will be seen below, the implementation of this directive has lagged behind 
schedule. 
2.2. Clean energy for all Europeans - package 
Power markets and systems have to adapt to the “4Ds transformation”: decarbonisation, decentralisation, 
digitisation and democratisation. Decentralisation refers to the proliferation of distributed energy 
resources. Digitisation shows up in optimized network operation & planning as well as in allowing new 
market transactions along the power value chain, pulling DR from prosumers. These evolutions are taking 
place very fast. 
On 30 November 2016 the EC published its so-called Clean energy for all Europeans legislative package 
(a.k.a. Winter Package), which consists of eight proposals to facilitate the transition to a “clean energy 
economy” and to reform the design and operation of the EU’s electricity market. The Clean Energy 
Package is setting the direction to the 4Ds transformation – the active customer era [6]. The legislative 
proposals include: 
 revised Internal Electricity Market Directive (EMD) and Electricity Market Regulation, 
 revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), 
 renewed Renewables Directive, 
 regulation on Governance of the Energy Union, 
 revised Energy Performance of Buildings directive. 
From the point of view of energy storages, the category of proposals aimed to bring about a new market 
design is most relevant. These proposals intend to amend and repeal Directive 2009/72 (Directive on the 
Internal Market for Electricity ) and Regulation 714/2009 (Electricity Market Regulation) and repeal 
Regulation 713/2009 on the ACER ( ACER Regulation ). These are referred to as the third package of 
electricity market as explained above. Generally speaking, the proposal fosters a market based approach. 
Certain measures are intended to enter into force and to apply as from 1 January 2020, while for others , 
such as the recast electricity market directive (EMD), no timetable for transposition has yet been 
indicated.  
The package has not yet been finished but is entering trilogue between European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission. It is more than likely that the final versions to be eventually adopted by the Council 
and the European Parliament will look very different from the latest proposals. 
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In the next paragraphs we will study some provisions of the Clean energy for all Europeans - package 
from the point of view of energy storages at customer premises. 
2.2.1. Smart metering 
Smart metering is of key importance in enabling consumer participation in implicit DR. The Third 
Energy Package already required EU Member States to ensure implementation of intelligent metering 
systems. This implementation may be conditional on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). For electricity, there 
is a target of rolling out at least 80% by 2020, of the positively assessed cases. Most states foresee a 
rollout of 80% or better by 2020 while some (e.g. Germany, Slovakia and Latvia) have opted for a 
selective rollout. The proposed EMD keeps the conditionality for roll-out but allows an individual 
customer to request a smart meter on fair terms. In this case, the customer has to pay for the installation of 
the meter. 
EC recommendation 2012/148/EU [7] provided a rough suggestion for the minimum functional 
requirements of smart metering systems. In practise, the functionalities of the rolled out meters have 
greatly varied. The proposed EMD amends the regulation by setting functional requirements for smart 
metering systems. For example, smart meters shall enable final customers to be metered and settled at the 
same time resolution as the imbalance period in the national market. The proposed EMD does not set any 
requirements for load control functionalities of the smart meter. 
2.2.2. Dynamic pricing and market entry 
Dynamic pricing, along with smart metering, is of key importance in enabling consumer participation in 
implicit DR. The proposed electricity market directive requires that every final customer is entitled, on 
request, to a dynamic electricity price contract by his supplier. Dynamic electricity price is also defined to 
reflect the price at the spot market, including at the day-ahead market at intervals at least equal to the 
market settlement frequency. This is a significant improvement to current situation where dynamic price 
contracts are offered only in a few member states. Of course, such contract requires that the customer has 
a smart meter.  
The position of the European Council and the EU parliament on this matter is somewhat divided [8]. 
According to the Council’s opinion consumers should have the possibility to request dynamic price 
contract from at least one supplier [9]. The European Parliament’s Industry, Research and Energy 
Committee (ITRE), on the other hand, believes that the dynamic price contracts need to be offered by all 
suppliers. Naturally the ITRE’s alternative would introduce more competition into the dynamic contracts 
and reduce the margins and fixed fees. 
Adopting a dynamic price tariff may mean supplier switching. Supplier switching will be made easier by 
the proposed EMD. The original proposal suggested 3 weeks’ maximum limit for supplier switching time 
but ITRE has suggested only 1 day after 2022. Suppliers will not be allowed to charge any switching-
related fees, however, the EU Member States may choose to permit suppliers under certain conditions to 
charge contract termination fees to customers willingly terminating fixed term supply contracts before 
their maturity. Household customers shall be entitled to participate in collective switching schemes. 
Furthermore, the proposal encourages active customers (those having DR resources) to enter all organized 
power markets, either individually or through aggregators.  
 
2.2.3. Independent aggregators 
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Aggregators are deregulated electricity market participants which have the technical means to control 
distributed energy resources such as loads (in other words DR) or distributed generation and offer the 
resulting power modulation to organized power markets or power system participants.  
Aggregator may be the electricity supplier of the controlled customers, or may be unaffiliated with the 
supplier, in which case the term independent aggregator is used. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
independent aggregator model are being disputed. Nordic energy regulators have not seen the whole 
concept of independent aggregator necessary in Nordic countries [10], while the Smart Energy Demand 
Coalition [11] strongly supports them. The effects are most likely dependent on the electricity retail 
market situation in each country. If there is little competition between suppliers and if they are affiliated 
with generators, independent aggregators can activate more DR. Independent aggregators can target all 
residential sources of DR within their natural limits; the offering is not limited to SETS. 
In the proposed EMD, European Commission requires that every consumer shall have possibility to 
participate in demand response (DR) and receive remuneration directly or through aggregators. This also 
introduces a new market participant, an independent aggregator. The independent aggregator is “a market 
participant that performs aggregation that is not affiliated to its customer’s supplier”. Customers can sign 
contracts with independent aggregator without asking permission from their supplier. Article 17 of 
proposed EMD specifically requires that aggregators shall not be required to pay compensation to 
suppliers. However, in order to ensure that balancing costs and benefits induced by aggregators are fairly 
assigned to market participants, Member States may exceptionally allow compensation payments 
between aggregators and balance responsible parties (BRP). These compensation payments shall be 
subject to approval by the national regulatory authorities. According to ITRE, compensation shall be 
strictly limited to cover the resulting costs [12]. For example the position of ENTSO-E has been that 
electricity suppliers must be compensated for the supply costs of power which is transferred to an 
independent aggregator by DR [13].  
Of course, it is not a straightforward task to calculate the cost impact and different national 
implementations will probably be made. The independent aggregator model is not specified in the 
detailed level by the directive. Thus there is room left for setting national regulations. In principle, some 
rules could be set by ENTSO-E but for example the guideline on electricity balancing [14] currently gives 
plenty of room for national TSO’s in calculating balances and prices. Common independent aggregator 
model across countries would foster market actor mobility [15]. However, the national markets for 
aggregation and for DR are in different phases of development. Ref. [15] suggests that e.g. requirements 
for metering and verification could be harmonized across countries. 
2.2.4. Imbalance settlement 
Imbalance settlement period (ISP) is the time period which is used by TSO’s to settle the energy 
imbalances of BRPs. The current ISPs in European countries are shown in Figure 1. According to the 
proposed regulation [16] the imbalance settlement period shall be 15 minutes in all control areas by 2025. 
This is also the latest possibility given by the regulation which is currently in force (guideline on 
electricity balancing, considering the possibility of national regulators to apply for postponement). 
However, the EU parliament is pushing for a faster implementation by 2021. The decision about the 
deadline will be made in autumn 2018.  
According to EBGL, all TSO’s of synchronous area can apply for an exemption of the harmonization. 
This is mainly relevant to GB and Ireland. 
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Figure 1: current imbalance settlement periods in European countries. Italy has a 60-minute ISP with the exception of 
Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) that are required by regulation to have a 15 minute ISP [17]. 
Shortening the ISP affects SETS and other DR assets via different mechanisms. While the overall need 
for balancing does not change, the responsibility is shifted more towards power markets. Thus SETS 
could be used to sell balancing services for the shorter ISP’s, which is well within their technical 
capability. Also for short span trading, such as within the hour, the storage capacity of SETS is not an 
obstacle. On the other hand, the shorter ISP will reduce the balancing duty of the TSO and therefore the 
demand for reserves [18]. As noted in Chapter 3, in many cases small-scale DR can also be offered as 
reserves and this source of income will then be reduced. 
According to the proposed regulation [16] market operators shall provide market participants with the 
opportunity to trade in market time units (MTU) at least as short as the imbalance settlement perod in 
both day-ahead and intraday markets. Shorterning the ISP immediately affects the intraday markets [18] 
but plans exists for later adaptation of day-ahead markets . Thus it will be possible to trade power 
modulation of SETS in 15 min MTU in coming years. ISP harmonization, however, does not imply 
immediate update of smart meters (which would be costly). E.g. in Nordic countries profiling (using 
statistical methods for deriving the consumption at ISP resolution) will be used for small consumers. 
Profiling is not sufficient for activating DR. 
2.2.5. Local use of flexibility 
DR may contribute to a wide range of different services in the distribution grid, transmission grid and in 
energy production. Conflicts between different services may also arise. Currently DSO’s may not be able 
to exploit DR. In some countries DSO’s do not have access to appropriate tools for procuring DR, while 
in many countries they are not adequately incentivised through the remuneration schemes in place to do 
so [19]. This will change in the future: the proposed EMD states that DSO’s may use DR (as well as 
electricity storages or other sources of flexibility) to solve issues in the distribution grid and DSOs shall 
define the standardized market products for the services to be procured via these flexibilities. ENTSO-E 
has opposed this proposal. According to ENTSO-E a direct consequence of an exclusive DSO design of 
flexibility products could be a capture of the offers for the needs of the distribution grids, which would 
lead to the creation of local markets with low liquidity, barriers for aggregation of flexibilities across 
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different distribution networks, and fragmentation between wholesale and retail markets. This would 
reduce the value SETS can provide to the electricity system and therefore also their revenue potential. 
In the future, the regulation aims to ensure electricity can be co-produced and shared in a local energy 
community (LEC). LEC will also be guaranteed equal access to participate in to markets. The ITRE 
committee has amended the proposed EMD [12]: 
Local energy communities are entitled to share electricity from generation assets within the 
community between its members or shareholders based on market principles, including applying 
existing or future ICT technologies such as virtual net metering schemes and those based on 
distributed ledger technologies, as well as through power purchase agreements or peer-to-peer 
trade arrangements for example. 
From the point of view of SETS this can be an important development. For example in a block of flats or 
among neighbours the excess PV production, produced by one resident or the housing company, could be 
fed into SETS installed by other residents. The share of self-consumption of locally produced power 
could be increased. However, no clear statement is made how the distribution fees should be calculated in 
such case. . 
 
2.3. ENTSO-E network codes 
In order to pursue the completion of the internal energy market, ENTSO-E has prepared a number of 
network codes, which contain detailed requirements for power system participants. The network codes 
could be called the rulebook for the new power system and market. Originally there were ten codes but 
they were later merged into eight. These are based on the target market model. The Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) was also involved in the process by giving framework 
guidelines for the preparation of the codes. The process of preparing and accepting the codes lasted 5–6 
years. After their acceptance the network codes have become EC regulations. They comprise some 500 
pages of text. Furthermore, structures have been put in place between ACER, European Commission and 
ENTSO-E to amend them if necessary and progressively transition them towards future Clean Energy 
Package objectives. 
Figure 2 shows the different network codes in a timeline relative to the power delivery hour. Here we 
focus only only three codes, which are most relevant for SETS. These are the network code on Capacity 
allocation and Congestion Management, guideline on Electricity Balancing, and System Operation 
guideline. These codes are most relevant for the short-term operation of the power system and demand 
response. 
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Figure 2: The different ENTSO-E network codes put into context within the timeframe (source ENTSO-E). 
2.3.1. Trading on power markets 
The network code on Capacity allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) concerns for example 
day-ahead and intra-day power markets. It concerns especially cross-border exchange but directly affects 
also trading within bidding zones. It encourages competition of power exchanges in the day-ahead 
market. The continuous intraday market coupling is also covered in the code and the implementation of 
the intraday trading platform “XBID” is expected to go live in June 2018, after a long development stage. 
The continous trading has, however, the drawback that cross-zonal (between bidding zones) transmission 
capacity cannot be properly priced [20]. The CACM regulation states that TSO’s must present a 
methodology for pricing the cross-zonal capacity. The proposed methodology augments continuous intra-
day trading with intra-day auctions. The intra-day auctions gain a better view of the supply-demand 
situation because they collect a large group of bids into the same process. The auction can thus also place 
a price on the cross-zonal transmission capacity.  
From the point of view of SETS the addition of intra-day auctions is most likely beneficial because it 
makes participation of small players easier [21]. They benefit from the uniform price auction. The 
auctions will likely be arranged several times a day, consequently the aggregator still has to maintain a 
continuous trading desk. The auctions could include the possibility for capability based bids, which are 
well established for clearing of intraday or balancing/ancillary services platforms in Ireland, Poland, 
Spain and Italy [21]. Such bids can include the payback effect of SETS – charging the storage back to its 
normal level after load reduction. 
2.3.2. Balancing markets 
The Electricity Balancing Guideline (EBGL) [14] concerns the specification, trading, pricing and 
settlement of balancing services, which are needed to constantly match demand and generation in the 
power system. It is also about allowing new players such as demand response and renewables to take part 
in this market. From the perspective of a party selling balancing power, the change will require 
harmonisation of balancing products on the European level. Spefically article 25 of EBGL states that by 
two years after entry into force of EBGL, all TSOs shall develop a proposal for a list of standard products 
for frequency restoration reserves (FRR) and replacement reserves (RR). There is no requirement for 
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standard product for frequency containment reserves (FCR). Requirements for FCR have been set in the 
system operation guideline (SOGL) [22] (former network code on load frequency control and reserves). 
SOGL includes regulations about the procurement and technical operation of power reserves and their 
cross-border exchange. Thus SOGL is important for the operation of balancing markets. In many cases 
SOGL delegates the specific details to individual TSO’s and in some cases the regulations concern 
synchronous areas, as opposed to whole EU. 
EBGL sets the common imbalance settlement period in EU to be 15 min by three years after the entry 
into force of the regulation. However, for compelling reasons national regulators may approve a 
postponement until January 2025. As mentioned above, the common imbalance settlement period is also 
covered in the prosed Electricity Regulation of the Clean Energy package. 
 
 
Figure 3: Member and observer countries of the MARI platform (source ENTSO-E).  
To support the implementation of the EBGL, several pilot initiatives have been set up for cross-border 
exchange of balancing services with the standard products required by EBGL1. The Manually Activated 
Reserves Initiative (MARI) started in late 2016 and the purpose is to design and implement a platform for 
the cross-border exchange of manually activated frequency restoration reserves (mFRR). The platform 
builds upon national existing platforms by letting balance services providers (BSP) connect to the 
national platform, while TSO’s then forward the balancing offers to the common MARI platform. The 
balancing energy market will expand, but the national TSO will continue to be the interface. Standard 
mFRR products are traded on the platform. The specification of standard products is ongoing but some 
features have been decided. Figure 4 shows the activation profile of the standards product. The balancing 
service provider (BSP), e.g. an aggregator, must send his offers (gate closure) 25 min before each ISP. 
                                               
1 See https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/eb/ 
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Activation takes place 7.5 min before the start of ISP and the BSP has 12.5 min to ramp power to full 
activation.  
 
Figure 4: The activation of standardized mFRR products.  
Similarly to MARI, the purpose of the PICASSO platform (Platform for the International Coordination of 
the Automatic frequency restoration process and Stable System Operation) is to enable cross-border 
trading of automatically activated frequency restoration reserves (aFRR). Standard aFRR products are 
traded in the platform. The time resolution of offers is that of ISP. BSP must send his offers (gate closure) 
25 min before each ISP and has 5 min to ramp power to full activation.  
For the slowest reserve category, replacement reserves (RR) the Trans European Replacement Reserves 
Exchange (TERRE) platform has been set up and the respective standard product has been defined.  
The common market for procurement and exchange of Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR 
cooperation) aims at the integration of balancing markets in the shortest time scale. This regional project 
currently involves ten TSO’s in the central Europe synchronous area, among others the French, German 
and Benelux TSO’s, while the Danish Energinet is also considering to join (as western Denmark belongs 
to the same synchronous area) [23]. The FCR Cooperation is organised with a TSO-TSO-model, where 
the FCR is procured through a common merit order list where all TSOs pool the offers they received. 
How do the network codes affect the owner of SETS? The standard reserve products can be reached with 
the performance of SETS, depending of course on the communication system used. Aggregators can 
more easily operate in several countries because of the standard products (requirements for aggregators, 
measurement and verification may still vary as explained in the next chapter). This increases competetion 
between aggregators, which is beneficial from the SETS point of view. Cross-border trading or reserves 
will be made easier and increase, which can increase demand for DR in some countries and decrease in 
others. 
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3. MARKET BARRIERS IN EUROPE 
Demand response (DR) can be categorised into two types [1]. First, price-based DR will introduce 
dynamic pricing in order to let consumers decide when and how they will curtail or shift their demand. 
Second, incentive-based DR will provide financial incentives for demand shedding independent from the 
electricity price at that time. Different market mechanisms are needed and different barriers apply for 
these DR categories. Below the sections 3.1–3.4 mainly deal with explicit DR and section 3.5 with 
implicit DR. 
3.1. Market access of DR 
DR has limited value if it cannot be sold and purchased by different power market participants. Different 
market places for power have been set up in different European countries. Power exchanges operate 
organized markets for power. Their rules concerning frequency of trading and product time resolution 
varies across countries. Balancing services are procured at various intervals ahead of real time and 
activated near real-time by TSO’s. Across Europe both the products for balancing services and the 
arrangements by which they are procured are currently very diverse. This is mainly due to historical 
reasons as each TSO individually designed their “balancing market” according to national specificities 
(generation portfolios, significant presence of internal congestions and level of interconnections with 
foreign markets) [24]. 
DR can naturally access organized power markets as part of the supplier’s portfolio. This is also the way 
how DR is operated in implicit demand response. In this case the size of the loads does not matter. The 
same is not true when DR is offered to balancing markets. In that case the resources are subject to a 
number of requirements or DR (large-scale or aggregated) may not be accepted at all to given balancing 
market. Below in Figure 2 the situation in certain European countries has been evaluated. 
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Figure 5: The level of acceptance of aggregated loads in power and balancing markets in Europe 
[11,25]. 
Below the situation in a number of countries is explained. 
3.1.1. Finland 
Aggregated loads can participate multiple markets, including balancing markets and wholesale markets. 
3.1.2. France 
According to [11] aggregated load can participate multiple markets, including FCR (local market 
‘Réglage Primaire de Fréquence’), mFRR (‘Réserves rapides’). FCR participation is through the FCR 
cooperation project. Aggregated DR can also participate in wholesale markets.  
3.1.3. Germany 
Aggregated loads can take part in most markets, including the wholesale day-ahead and intraday markets 
and balancing markets [1,11]. However, DSO may hinder the operation. The DSO legally has to approve 
consumer participation in the balancing market, and, can limit or prohibit such involvement entirely. 
While in practice there has not been any unfounded refusal by DSO’s, to date there have been significant 
delays in some projects caused by the discussions with the grid operators in order to get such approvals 
[11]. 
3.1.4. Latvia 
The Electricity Market Act provides that aggregators can be operational in Latvia in 2019. By January 1, 
2018 Cabinet regulations will be developed that will define the rights and obligations of the aggregators 
and relations with other members of the electricity system and the market. Taking into account the small 
market in Latvia, it is expected that already existing electricity traders will act as aggregators. However, it 
is not known specifically which markets aggregators can enter. However, the local TSO AST has 
regularly expressed their interest in using DR for balancing services. 
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3.2. Market access of independent aggregators 
One measure to increase the flexibility in the markets is to enable market actors to aggregate resources 
more freely than today. Aggregation of small loads into larger blocks for the purposes of power markets 
is possible in many different ways and different rules have been proposed. One attribute of the 
aggregation process is the position of the DR aggregator. Aggregation can be done by conventional 
suppliers and BRPs. Still, new actors including third-party or independent aggregators, have the potential 
to think outside of the "path of dependency" that may come with conventional business [26]. Independent 
aggregators may stimulate competition in the field of DR procurement. Traditional suppliers may not be 
interested in increasing demand flexibility if they are part of a larger company which also acts as 
generator.  
However, considering the added complexity that the introduction of independent aggregators brings, it is 
not clear whether they can benefit DR markets as whole. While in some countries market rules for 
independent aggregators have been developed, in other countries their benefits are doubted [10]. The 
relationship between the independent aggregator and customers suppliers, and the BRPs of the suppliers  
requires careful analysis. 
The current regulatory status for the independent aggregators has been evaluated in a review conducted 
by Smart Energy Demand Coalition [11]. The status in selected European countries is explained below. 
 
Figure 6: Regulatory status for independent aggregators in European countries. [11] 
 
3.2.1. Austria 
Before entering the balancing market, independent aggregators must bilaterally negotiate with each 
respective BRP concerning consumer data, curtailed volumes and money exchange, which creates 
difficulties and conflicts of interest between parties [11]. Aggregators must wait sometimes over a year, 
for this contractual arrangement to be completed. 
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3.2.2. Finland 
Independent aggregators since the beginning of 2017 can participate in the frequency containment 
disturbance reserve (FCR-D), and since the beginning of 2018 in the frequency containment normal 
operation reserve (FCR-N). This is because the amount of energy which is exchanged in FCR-D market is 
fairly small, and consequently the side effects for the suppliers and BRPs are small. Admitting 
independent aggregators in this market increased DR supply considerably. In FCR-N the symmetricity of 
the activation reduces the side effects.  
The Nordic TSO’s are considering the conditions of admittance of independent aggregators into other 
reserve (balancing) markets [26]. A pilot is currently being carried out in Finland concerning the 
reimbursement model between aggregator and BRPs in the regulating power market (mFRR). In this pilot 
TSO calculates the actual delivery and the imbalance caused by reserve activation per BRP based on the 
measurements and a case specific baseline model. Then TSO removes that imbalance from the BRP with 
a trade that is priced with the day-ahead market price for the activation hour.  
3.2.3. France 
Independent aggregators are able to access both wholesale and balancing markets [11]. The NEBEF 
mechanism (Notification d’Echange de Blocs d’Effacement, ‘Notification of Exchange of Blocks of Load 
Shedding’) establishes the transfer of an energy block from the BRP of the consumer’s energy provider to 
the DR service operator and then to the target markets [27]. The contribution of this mechanism is to 
allow the bid of DR offering on the energy market by an independent aggregator.  
Different mechanisms have been established by the law 2014-764 for compensation between the 
independent aggregator and suppliers. The aggregator can choose a regulated compensation scheme or 
make a separate contract with the suppliers. In the regulated scheme a financial transfer (in €/MWh) from 
DR operator to the retailers of the curtailed customers represents the energy component of the energy 
supply price for the customers participating [11]. The price scale is set by the TSO, and is differentiated 
for metered and profiled sites. 
3.2.4. Great Britain 
Independent cannot participate in wholesale markets or the balancing mechanism (a British balancing 
market with no forward commitments) [11]. They can take part in other balancing markets. Aggregators 
are not required to ask for permission or to inform the retailer prior to load management and have direct 
access to consumers.  
3.2.5. Germany 
Independent aggregators can participate in balancing markets but not wholesale markets because there is 
not framework in place to define the interactions with the energy retailer and other market parties [11]. 
Also for balancing markets, regulation has not been issued to encourage the operation of independent 
aggregators. The independent aggregator should make an agreement with the consumers’ BRPs about 
schedule exchange and payments. This is a particular difficulty because there are no standards for this, 
and the BRP and retailer often have no interest in working with the aggregator to reach such an 
agreement. The reason for this is that BRPs/retailers usually see the aggregator as a competitor, someone 
who is approaching their customer to offer services the BRP/retailer offers, or may intend to offer in 
future [11]. Naturally the aggregator also needs to sign a contract with the consumers, TSO (in case of 
balancing services) and consumers’ DSO, as noted above. 
3.3. Product requirements 
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Traditionally the generators used to be the only players in the market. Thus originating from the design of 
the regulatory framework, product barriers exist because market structures are still focused on the 
characteristics of generators [1]. Product requirements refer to the capabilities of the balancing service 
provider to provide or consume power in the required way. Product requirements may concern e.g. 
 direction and symmetricity (power feed or take or both incorporated in the same offer) 
 preparation period, 
 ramping rate,  
 full activation time,  
 minimum and maximum quantity, 
 deactivation period,  
 minimum and maximum duration of delivery period;  
 validity period of the offer. 
The service provider may be able to set their own product requirements, which can include e.g. 
 minimum duration between the end of deactivation period and the following activation (minimum 
rest period), 
 maximum number of product activations in day or week, 
 divisibility, 
 links between products such as combined sell and purchase offers. 
According to the EBGL standard balancing product should include the possibility to define the minimum 
duration between the end of deactivation period and the following activation. The implementation of such 
restrictions, which can be quite useful for SETS, on current balancing markets varies. For example in the 
Finnish regulating power market (FRR) activation implies automatic unavailability during the next hour if 
the BSP so wishes. 
Below examples of product requirements from selected European countries are listed. 
3.3.1. Austria 
A few historic regulations remain which are not appropriate for consumers, these treat a single consumer 
as if they were a large generation unit, for example by requiring them to have a dedicated telephone line 
to the TSO in order to provide DR [11]. This undermines the position of the aggregator and significantly 
increases the cost of participating in DR for consumers. Minimum bids size are not a large problem in the 
balancing market. 
3.3.2. Finland  
For the day-ahead market so-called flexible bid has been in use for years. It allows an aggregator to 
capture the highest or lowest hourly price during a day.  
In balancing markets product requirements generally are not a large problem. As SETS is capable of very 
fast response, the activation time is not a problem. For mFRR the minimum bid size (5 MW) presents 
some restriction for new entrants. The minimum activation time for FCR is currently 15 min (article 156 
of SOGL allows between 15 and 30 min), which is not problematic for SETS. 
3.3.3. Germany 
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For the “secondary reserve” (aFRR) response must be able to be sustained for up to 12 hours for and up 
to 60 hours over the weekend but shortening the requirement has been considered by the regulator [11]. 
This is a significant barrier for DR. Similarly for “minute reserve” (mFRR) the response must be able to 
be sustained for 4 hours even though the service is normally only required for much shorter periods [11]. 
3.3.4. Great Britain 
There are several different balancing markets and from the point of view of residential DR the 
requirements vary by market. The British BSPs have noted the complexity of the balancing service 
products. This complexity is acting as a barrier to new entrants and technologies, but also making it 
difficult for existing parties to identify the optimum tendering strategy and hence deliver best value to the 
end consumer [28]. The TSO will attempt to simplify and make the products transparent. Table 1 lists the 
current products where demand can participate. Reserves are defined as manually controlled resources 
and frequency response includes resources with automatic response. As part of the revision of the product 
structure, specific products such as enhanced frequency response and frequency control by demand 
management will be discontinued. 
Primary, high and secondary frequency response (together “firm frequency response”) are tendered each 
month. The BSP may specify the hours of the day when the offer is valid. Different schedule may be set 
for working days, Saturdays and Sundays. Still, for providers who could provide frequency response but 
who cannot forecast or control their availability (including SETS), the timescales of the market represent 
a barrier to participation [28]. 
Table 1: Frequency response and reserve services in Great Britain [28,29]. 
Category Subcategory  Direction Notes 
Frequency 
response 
primary positive activation 10 s, sustained for 20 s 
high negative activation 10 s, sustained 
indefinetely 
secondary positive activation 30 s, sustained for 30 
min 
enhanced positive activation 1 s (to be discontinued) 
demand 
management 
positive activation 2 s of signal; aggregation 
possible (to be discontinued) 
Reserves fast reserve positive activation 2 min, sustained 15 min, 
minimum volume 50 MW 
 short-term operating 
reserve 
positive activation 4 h, sustained 2 h; 
aggregation possible 
 demand turn-up negative activation within a few hours 
(agreed case by case) 
 
 
3.3.5. Belgium 
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Belgium, as opposed to many other European countries, allows asymmetric bids in the FCR market [1]. 
This makes DR participation somewhat easier, although aggregation of different types of loads can also 
allow symmetric bids.  
3.4.  Measurement and verification 
The DR portfolio which delivers certain power product should be monitored in order to make sure that 
the product is actually delivered as stated in the product requirements. This is crucial from the power 
system reliability point of view. Measurement and verification can also be considered as part of technical 
requirements, and is given less attention in this report. 
The performance monitoring process occurs at two stages: prequalification stage where a certain DR 
portfolio is admitted to a market, and continous monitoring of conformance to the product specifications 
during product delivery. Prequalification for FCR and FRR is required by the ENTSO-E System 
operation guideline articles 155 and 159 [22]. The exact process is determined by the TSO and may 
include requirements concerning e.g. 
 frequency of power measurements, 
 accuracy and speed of local frequency measurement 
 power delivery in different grid conditions. 
The continuous monitoring may include requirements concerning e.g. 
 baseline calculation method; 
 Frequency of power measurements and other data provided in near real-time to the TSO.  
 Communication protocols. 
General requirement for the active power measurements is given in article 154 of SOGL for FCR and 
article 158 for FRR. Further details are set by each TSO. For example, article 154 states that the active 
power data of small FCR providing units may be aggregated but SOGL does not state explicitly to which 
degree an aggregator can use estimation in providing the power measurements. Providing the active 
power measurements from thousands of units reliably in real time will be costly. Several issues have to be 
considered. The most important is the communication pathway. High reliability and availability and low 
latency should be expected [30]. The reliability of the existing internet connections in dwellings for the 
purpose of ensuring correct operation of power system may be doubted. For example Deconinck [30] 
rules out mobile connections for this purpose and rates WLAN (which could be used inside a dwelling 
between SETS device and router) as partially suitable. Of course these technologies have greatly 
developed during the past ten years. Systems using existing internet infrastructure are also susceptible to 
malicious attacks. 
The experience in the Realvalue project has been that it is difficult to reach near 100 % availibility with 
connections to individual devices. Reasons include e.g. device malfunctions and unexpected user 
behavior. Availability of mobile connections to gateways in dwellings was only about 50 % in Spanish 
trials in the ADDRESS project [31]. While these issues could be mostly solved, pursuing near 100 % 
availibility increases costs. 
Another possiblity would be that the aggregator provides real measurements only from a sample of 
devices and estimates other data with statistical methods. A sufficiently large sample (still smaller than 
the total number of devices) ensures that the desired accuracy is obtained. Sampling should take into 
account the possible differing control of different device groups by the aggregator. For verification, the 
measurements of all units could be provided to TSO at later time.  
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3.4.1. Finland 
For small consumers the 1 min real-time measurements, required for FCR markets, set requirements on 
the communication technology and increases costs. The baseline methodology not yet been set. 
3.4.2. France 
In organized power markets and balancing markets, three groups of baseline methodologies are available 
[11]: 
 Based on values just before and after the DR event, 
 historical values either declared by the aggregator or calculated using a statistical approach based 
on a longer period; 
 specific case-by-case method for large portfolios. 
In many countries the baseline is negotiated on case-by-case basis (e.g. Great Britain, Austria). 
3.5. Availability of dynamic price contracts 
Market parties need to be given the right price signals. This is paramount for bringing more flexibility in 
the system. In short, align markets with physics, recognising renewables increase volatility in grid flows 
and congestions. From the small customer point of view, dynamic price signals with 15–60 minutes’ 
granularity will soon be reality. 
Market acceptance of dynamic pricing can only be achieved if its benefits to both suppliers and 
consumers can be proved. Suppliers may not have an incentive to offer such tariffs, especially when they 
are part of larger company which also has a generation wing. Indeed, for integrated generation-supplier 
companies, high peak prices can result in significant profits, which would be eroded by increased DR [5]. 
In France a system of ToU tariffs has been in place for more than 40 years [5] and currently ten of the 
eleven suppliers are offering ToU [32]. In addition, EdF was a forerunner in dynamic tariffs by 
introducing the Tempo tariff in the early 90’s. Tempo tariff is an advanced dynamic (CPP) tariff with 
peak pricing determined by anticipated system requirement. The tariff is marketed for high use 
households, such as very large houses, and those with electric heating and full-time occupation, and for 
small business customers [34]. The tariff comes with six rates of electricity pricing based upon the actual 
weather on particular days and on hours of use. Each day of the year is colour coded. There are three 
colours, blue, white and red which correspond to low, medium and high electricity prices. Each day then 
has a ToU tariff with day-night variation, whose prices levels (and to some extent time zones) are 
determined by the color of the day. Customers are informed each evening about the colour for the next 
day. At 8 pm a signal is sent down power lines using a ripple control system. Customers can then control 
their loads manually or using home automation (especially for heating loads).  
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Table 2: Current offering of time-dependent electricity supply tariffs for small consumers in selected European 
countries [5,32,33]. 
Country Real-
time 
CPP ToU notes 
Austria    Real-time supply pricing is being introduced. 
Denmark    ToU is available for customers with hourly metering 
Estonia    Off-peak tariffs and real time tariffs (for smart metered 
consumers) are available. 
Finland    Real time tariffs are available from several suppliers. 
France    Selection of available tariff schemes (peak and off-peak, 
Tempo tariff (CPP tariff) and ToU tariffs. 
Germany    Mostly day-night ToU 
Great Britain    Mostly day-night ToU. RTP has been demonstrated. 
Ireland    ToU offering is mandatory for suppliers. Normally day-night 
ToU. 
Italy     
Norway    See discussion in the text 
Slovenia    ToU and CCP are applied in Slovenia, and they are 
established in the law 
Spain    Consumers can choose RTP where smart meter with full 
telemanagement has been installed 
Sweden    ToU tariffs are offered to all customers by some grid 
companies. 
Switzerland    CPP and RTP not available for small customers 
 
ToU tariffs have also been in place in the UK since the 1970s for smaller consumers [5]. In 2015 around 
13 % subscribed to ToU tariffs such as the Economy 7 tariff, which offers a lower supply tariff for 7 
hours at night.  
“Real-time tariff” is a misnomer because in their most common form prices are set the previous day and 
not close to real time. We can talk about dynamic hourly tariffs but in some countries 30 min is used as 
load registering period and in future consumer loads in EU are most conveniently (to match with the 
imbalance settlement period) measured with 15 min registering period. Real-time tariffs are offered to 
small customers in relatively few countries, notably Finland, Norway, Spain and Estonia. These are based 
on hourly consumption. In Norway for small customers that have the possibility for hourly metering (will 
be possible for all in 2019), hourly real time prices are possible. In France RTP is not available to small 
customers. The energy ombudsman, Jean Gaubert, has opposed dynamic billing on the basis of the risk 
which possible high wholesale market prices present especially to vulnerable customers [35].  
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4. GRID ENVIRONMENT 
4.1. Smart meter roll-out 
The fundamental requirement for price-based DR and certain types of explicit DR is a smart meter, which 
provides accurate measurements at high time resolution, and in some cases the ability to control loads. 
Indeed, several smart meters can be exploited to extract several benefits: improve retail processes, allow 
distribution system operators to manage power quality and outages, and enable DR and improve energy 
efficiency through feedback. Implementation of intelligent metering systems, subject to positive cost-
benefit evaluation, was already mandated by the Third Energy Package and the EC published a set of 
recommended minimum functional requirements for the meters [7]. These are based on the work done by 
CENELEC, CEN and ETSI based on the EC mandate M/441. 
In practise the meter functionalities and implementation of the roll-out have greatly varied across 
European countries [36]. Figure 7 shows the situation of different countries in a two-dimensional plane. 
The abscissa of the plane measures the legal and regulatory status of smart metering, and the ordinate 
progress in smart metering implementation. We see that among the depicted countries there is a rather 
clear relationship between implementation and regulation. There are no examples where the 
implementation would be driven solely by market signals (the upper left corner in the plane). 
 
Figure 7: Legal, regulatory and market situation in the European electric smart metering implementing process 
(progress in September 2016) [33]. 
4.1.1. Finland 
The Government Statute on measurement and settlement of electricity supply (5.2.2009/66) stated that 
DSO’s must provide at least 80 % of customers with hourly interval meters by 2014. In practise nearly 
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100 % smart meter coverage was reached by 2014. The meters also include remote-controlled relays for 
load control, normally one for ToU based control and one for other load control.  
4.1.2. Great Britain 
In Great Britain the government aims to roll out 53 million smart meters to domestic consumers and 
smaller non-domestic consumers by the end of 2020 [32]. Unlike in many other countries, it is the 
electricity supplier’s responsibility to install the meter. Smart meters are not compulsory and customers 
can opt out. The meters have the necessary functionality to reflect real-time prices (will store the amount 
of energy the customer has used in each 30 minute period) and allow either direct consumer responses or 
automated services via third parties [32].  
4.1.3. France 
In France the “Linky” smart meter was especially developed for Enedis (former ERDF). In 2021 the 
coverage should be 90 % [32].  
4.1.4. Germany 
The cost-benefit analysis for large-scale roll-out by 2020 was negative. Therefore the country has chosen 
a conditional rollout. In the first step, only large customers with a consumption of over 10,000 kWh have 
to install a smart meter. From 2020 the rollout scheme includes consumers with annual electricity 
consumption higher than 2,000 kWh [33].  
4.1.5. Norway 
The deployment of smart meters to all customers will be completed in Norway by January 2019. After 
that all customers will have the possibility for hourly metering of their consumption. For customers that 
have already got a new smart meter installed, hourly metering is not activated for all customers yet. In the 
beginning the smart meters will be used for monthly meter reading. 
4.1.6. Spain 
Cost-benefit analysis for large-scale roll-out was carried out but the results are not public. In 2016 Smart 
meter roll-out was progressing rapidly, with most of the 5 main DSO’s reached over 70 % penetration 
[33]. 
4.1.7. Latvia 
The cost-benefit analysis for large-scale roll-out by 2020 was negative or inconclusive, but smart 
metering was found to be economically justified for particular groups of customers [33]. The largest DSO 
is slowly rolling out smart meters. 
4.2. Grid tariffs 
Distribution grid tariffs form one part of the electricity price which the end-user has to pay and thus affect 
the optimal use of DR. They may provide more opportunities for DR to reduce grid fees. 
Fixed tariff is currently the most common tariff type for small consumers. Static time-of-use (ToU) is a 
widely used model internationally. The tariff follows a normal grid capacity utilisation profile, so that the 
tariff is high at normal peak load times. In the Nordic countries, ToU tariffs have been most commonly 
used in Finland. As for other countries, France, UK and Germany are the most prominent cases [37]. ToU 
grid tariff can provide some opportunities for SETS but can also interfere with market based operation. In 
many countries demand charges (based on peak power consumption calculated in various ways) are under 
discussion [8]. In principle avoiding demand charges can introduce another income source for SETS but 
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they can also disturb offering other services and lead to inefficient use of the grid [38]. Thus careful 
design of the tariff is necessary.  
Below examples of current grid tariffs in several EU countries are listed. 
4.2.1. Denmark 
DSOs are free to set their own tariffs based on their approved methodology. Demand charges are not 
allowed at the moment [37]. It is the DSOs’ responsibility to adjust revenues in accordance with the 
revenue cap and/or maximum return, set by the national regulator. In June 2015, the national regulator 
accepted a new, industry wide tariff model [39]. The model opens up for ToU tariffs for all groups of 
consumers. Smart meters, which are required for this, have been rolled out to almost all customers.  
4.2.2. Spain 
The Spanish law 54/1997, 27th of November, of Electric Sector, establishes that electric energy 
distribution is a regulated activity, subject to regulatory development by the Government of Spain. Grid 
tariffs are regulated by the state. The grid tariffs are composed of a power term (demand charge) (Tp) and 
an energy term (Te). In this way, the access cost depends both on the consumer’s consumed power and 
energy. Figure 8 shows the grid tariffs for small customers. The power term exists even for residential 
customers. 
 
Figure 8: Regulated grid tariffs in Spain for low-voltage customers. “Periodo1–3” refer to the ToU time zones, which 
refer to day, night and morning + late evening. 
4.2.3. Finland 
Residential customers face a flat distribution tariff or ToU tariff with either day-night time zones or 
winter day and rest of the year time zones. In the preparatory work for the electricity market law (HE 
20/2013 vp 54§) and in the decree about metering and clearing of electricity supply (217/2016 chapter 7) 
it was required that DSO’s must provide at least the following distribution tariffs: 
 flat tariff, 
 ToU tariff with day-night time zones, 
 ToU tariff with winter day and rest of the year time zones, 
 hourly tariff. 
In practise the DSO’s do not offer hourly grid tariffs. In the preparatory work for the electricity market 
law (HE 20/2013 vp 25§) it was required that DSO’s cooperate to create uniform hierarchical structure 
for grid tariffs in different voltage levels. This means that the tariff structures of different DSO’s should 
be compatible. It was not required that the price level of the grid tariffs should be uniform across different 
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DSO’s. There are no other specific regulations about the required grid tariff structure. For example, there 
are no regulations about how the costs should be allocated to different tariff components. In practise the 
price levels of different tariff components have varied widely across the approximately 90 different 
DSO’s. 
In recent years demand charges for residential customers have also been discussed and studied in several 
research projects. They were adopted e.g. by Helen sähköverkko DSO in Helsinki region in 2017.  
The energy component of the tariff is paid for the delivered energy and thus self-consumption is 
encouraged. 
4.2.4. Austria 
Residential customers face a flat tariff. ToU tariffs exist in the monthly level, and thus have little effect on 
DR. There are major differences in the ToU time zones within the country [40]. Distribution tariffs are 
paid for the consumed energy and thus self-consumption is encouraged. 
4.2.5. Germany 
In Germany household customers and SME with less than 100 MWh annual consumption pay only a flat 
distribution tariff [41]. High growth in DG combined with the very large number of distribution system 
operators raises critical questions about increasing grid costs, and how the tariffs to recover these costs 
should be designed and allocated among grid users. In future time-differentiated demand charges (at least 
for larger customers) or dynamic tariffs tied to market energy prices could be options. 
4.2.6. Italy 
The network tariff paid by final customers consists of: 
 fixed component (euro/customer)  
 demand charge component related to capacity (euro/kW)  
 variable component related to energy (euro/kWh) 
Tariffs are geographically‐uniform; it is a legal requirement that the same network tariff for final 
customers is applied throughout the country [40]. ToU tariffs are not applied. Residential customers face 
significant demand charges which encourage them to avoid load variations. 
4.2.7. Great Britain 
Residential and small SME’s pay a flat distribution tariff or ToU tariff with two time zones.  
4.2.8. Norway 
There is an ongoing discussion about the type of the grid tariff. The grid tariff will be renewed when all 
customers have hourly metering of their consumption (2019). A hearing round for new regulations was 
performed in winter 2017-2018. The response from the national regulator will be available during the 
spring 2018 [42].  
4.2.9. Latvia 
Residential customers pay a flat distribution tariff or ToU tariff with two time zones . 
4.3. Policies for prosumers 
According to ITRE wording of the proposed EMD 
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Active customers are entitled to generate, store, consume and sell self-generated electricity in all 
organised markets either individually or through aggregators without being subject to 
discriminatory or disproportionately burdensome procedures and charges that are not cost 
reflective. 
In order to support deployment of renewable energy sources and distributed generation many EU member 
states adopted different types of subsidy mechanisms. Here we limit ourselves to photovoltaic (PV) plants 
because they are the most common type of distributed generation in residential buildings. Mechanisms 
promoting self-consumption of PV electricity are based on the idea that PV electricity will be used first 
for local consumption and that all this electricity should not be injected into the grid [43]. Smart thermal 
storages are introduced into the equation as one way of increasing self-consumption in a flexible manner. 
Essentially the mechanisms dictate what benefits prosumers get from self-consumed energy and energy 
exported to the grid. Figure 9 shows the most important components of a self-consumption scheme. 
Typically the revenue of self-consumed energy consists of savings in the energy bill. At the same time 
variable grid fees are saved. Some countries (e.g. Spain) introduce an additional tax that recovers a part of 
these grid costs [43]. The revenue of exporting PV electricity into the grid varies considerably from one 
country to another. Many EU countries also dictate that small producers do not have to pay electricity tax 
for the self-consumed energy [44]. The scheme should also define self-consumption. Essentially it is the 
energy which is consumed simultaneously with the production. However, some smart meters e.g. in 
Finland also count production as exported energy if it is connected to a different phase than consumption. 
When the period during which consumption can be compensated with production is extended, the regime 
of net metering is entered. Geographical scope refers to the concept of LEC which was already visited in 
Section 2.2.5.  
  
Figure 9: Components of PV self-consumption scheme (adapted from [43]). 
SETS is an excellent way to increase self-consumption, though opposing seasonality of space heating and 
solar irradiation limit the opportunity. Features of self-consumption scheme which decrease the value of 
exported energy and limit net metering opportunity are beneficial for SETS. In UK for example exported 
energy receives a special bonus which reduces the incentive for self-consumption.  
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OVERCOMING THE 
BARRIERS  
Many regulatory changes concerning residential DR are being carried out in the EU level, including the 
Clean energy for all Europeans - package and implementation of ENTSO-E network codes. EU drives for 
market based solutions and for the inclusion of the smart customer and the demand response potential to 
be found there. Therefore there is little need for new regulations in EU level. The new directives and 
regulations are hard to improve since their final forms have not emerged yet. However, the 
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implementation of the directives in national legislation and the implementation of network codes by 
TSO’s can be guided to consider residential DR.The following areas of development can be seen where 
barriers can be reduced: 
 Auction periods for balancing markets should accommodate the types of DR which may be 
difficult to forecast several days ahead. 
 Adoption of intra-day auctions in power markets may offer a level playing field for aggregators. 
The auctions could also include possibility to submit capability based bids, which can better 
capture the dynamic ability of SETS and other DR. 
 Dynamic tariffs should be available for everybody (as dictated by the proposed EMD), and smart 
meters for all end-users who request one, as the directives hopefully will propose even in their 
final form. The cost of installing a smart meter is a barrier. End-users in countries. which (based 
on a cost-benefit-analysis), have come to the conclusion of no mandatory installations, will be at a 
disadvantage, if they have to also pay for smart meters to be able to use their flexibility on the 
markets. 
 Prequalification can be a laborious process for the aggregator. It may mean that each site must be 
equipped with power meter which can work with seconds granularity. If the customer portfolio 
changes, prequalification may be invalidated, depending on the rules set by TSO. For SETS it 
could be possible to make a prequalificiation for the device, and not for the customer portfolio 
where SETS has been installed. This approach may not work if there are issues which depend on 
the specific customer portfolio (e.g. performance of the communication pathway). 
 Real-time measurements of consumed power must be provided to the TSO, as stated by the 
ENTSO-E system operation guideline. For example in Finland they must be sent once a minute 
from each site. For a large customer portfolio, this may be unnecessary. A sample of customers 
can likely provide the measured power with adequate accuracy, while the majority of customers 
could be estimated with statistical models. 
 The regulation of local energy communities (LEC) could greatly improve the feasibility of SETS. 
Often it is not the same people who install DG and SETS and it may be more affordable to install 
a large amount of DG in one place. Ability to connect the local generation and SETS across 
apartments and real estates increases their value. 
 Baseline methodologies for different customers and applicances should be developed and 
published. Their number should reflect different customer behavior but should be limited as far as 
possible. 
 When grid tariffs are changed, the regulators should analyze the effects on the ability to provide 
DR for different markets. Distribution tariffs should not hamper the participation of DR. In some 
countries there is a tendency to introduce demand charges for residential customers. Most of 
distribution network costs are not related to distributed energy, but to distribution capacity and 
network peak loads, which in the future bolsters the use of demand charges: 
o The demand that forms the basis for the demand charges should be measured only at the 
time window where the network is at strain. If it is in the winter at daytime, it might 
mean that a PV owner might have higher costs than today, which is fair. PV owners’ 
demand put the same strain on the network as not-owners.   
o Although demand charges will have an adverse effect on most business cases for electric 
heating, constructed in an intelligent way as described above, end-user SETS would 
benefit compared to direct resistance heaters. 
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 The Clean Energy for all Europeans package includes the mandatory introduction of independent 
aggregators. The aggregator model, including compensation between aggregator and other parties, 
should be carefully analyzed by national regulators, to produce fair and efficient solution. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This report explored the current barriers for residential DR, such as that provided by SETS. We found out 
that different barriers exists, such as those of market access, market rules, supplier interest and grid 
regulation. The situation also varies from country to another. Many changes are currently taking place in 
the residential DR field. The ENTSO-E grid codes have been finished but their implementation is on-
going. At the same time, the EU Clean Energy for all Europeans package is entering final trilogue 
between European Parliament, the European Council and the Commission. The active consumer is the 
core concern of the package. The directive proposals belonging to the package do not go to the detail 
level. Therefore we cannot yet say with certainty what kind of changes it will bring to residential DR. 
However, we identified topics and more detailed suggestions which could increase the feasibility of 
demand response offered by residential thermal storages. 
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